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There is a common agreement that education is an essential part of a stable democracy. This is 
based on the belief that education encourages citizens to participate in democratic processes, 
and provides them with the knowledge to understand and accept political principles, as well as 
necessary skills to become politically engaged. A vast body of research has established that 
there is a correlation between education and voter participation. However, few have been able 
to estimate the causal effect. We contribute to accumulating research on the causal effect of 
education on voter participation using the Norwegian school reform from 1960 that extended 
the years of compulsory schooling from seven to nine, creating an exogenous shock in school 
attendance among Norwegian pupils. First, we apply the method of instrumental variables (IV). 
We use Norwegian Election Surveys as our main data source. We find no significant effect of 
reform implementation on level of education (first stage estimates). Second, we exploit the 
staggered implementation of the reform in a differences-in-differences approach using 
municipality level data. We do not find a causal effect of education on voter participation. This 
is possibly due to the absence of registration laws that represent voting barriers in Norway. 
Heterogeneity tests reveal a negative effect of education on voter participation in the 
municipalities with relatively high unemployment and low taxable income per tax payer. These 
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Creating a quality democracy is important both for the individual and the society as a whole. It 
is therefore important that we increase our understanding of what mechanisms that forms our 
democracy. There is a common agreement that education is an essential part of a stable 
democracy. This is based on the belief that education encourages citizens to participate in 
democratic processes, and provides them with the knowledge to understand and accept political 
principles, as well as necessary skills to become politically engaged (Wolfinger and 
Rosenstone, 1980, Nie et al., 1996, Milligan et al., 2004, Dee, 2004). Friedman (1962) argues 
that without a minimum degree of literacy and knowledge, as well as acceptance of a common 
set of values among citizens, a stable and democratic society is impossible.  
 
A wide range of empirical literature has provided evidence of a strong correlation between 
education and various civic behaviours, in particular is education associated with increased 
voter participation (Wolfinger and Rosenstone, 1980, Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993, Putnam, 
1995).1 Smets and Van Ham (2013) provide a meta-analysis and find age and education as two 
of the most important determinants of voter participation across different democratic countries. 
However, these are not necessarily causal relationships. These results might be biased if both 
education and voter participation are correlated with unobserved factors specific to individuals, 
such as ability, family background or childhood culture. For instance, children who grew up in 
engaged families and communities that stressed civic responsibility might also be more likely 
to attend to higher education. If such factors exist, to make causal inference would be to 
misinterpret the results. The aim of this paper is to investigate the causal effect of education on 
political behaviour by citizens in Norway. More precisely:  
 
“Does the length of education have a causal impact on voter participation?” 
 
Democracy is interpreted in several different ways, but Abraham Lincoln made a definition of 
democracy as "the government of the people, by the people and for the people" that is 
commonly used. Political parties are freely created, and constitutes as spokesmen for ideals and 
political objectives of the population. Citizens are free to exercise their sovereignty by voting 
at these parties (Becker and Raveloson, 2008). Hall and Jones (1998) argue elections are vital 
                                                




benchmarks of the democratic process because they educate and socialize, and generate 
dialogue and debate. Pelkonen (2012) argue that although voter participation legitimizes 
political outcomes and democracy, it should not be presented as a perfect measure of the quality 
of democratic process. How informed the voters are and their ability to make good choices is 
also important in this context. However, voter turnout is a measure that receives great attention 
from the media and social scientists, as it reflects the engagement of people living under 
democracy.  
 
Statistics Noway (SSB) (2015) reports the official voter participation in total was 78.2% in 
2013, thus an increase from 76.4% in 2009 and 77.4% in 2005. SSB (2016) reports descriptive 
statistics of a higher voter participation among citizens with a university or college degree in 
the national election in 2013 in Norway. 90% of these citizens voted, against 79% among 
citizens with only high school education. Among those who only attended primary school the 
voter participation was 65%.  
 
If education has an effect on citizens voting behaviour, it has important policy implications. 
The belief in civic returns to education has been one of the most important arguments of 
government intervention in the education market (Dee, 2004). In Norwegian politics, education 
is a ground pillar. The Ministry of Education and Research aim at having one of the best 
educational systems in the world when it comes to participation, implementation and 
accomplishment. They emphasize that quality of education is crucial for which civic qualities 
the inhabitants develop (Kunnskapsdepartementet, 2007). If education increases voter 
participation, one could expect an improvement in the quality of the democratic decision-
making in the long run (Pelkonen, 2012). 
 
Milligan et al. (2004) investigate the effect of compulsory schooling laws on the likelihood of 
becoming politically involved in the United States and the United Kingdom. The researchers 
exploit compulsory schooling laws and child labour laws in an instrumental variables approach. 
They find a strong and robust relationship of education on voting in the U.S., but not in the 
United Kingdom, possibly indicating that U.S. registration rules are obstacles to participation 
and that education might contribute to citizens overcoming these obstacles. Pelkonen (2012) 
conducts a similar study by using Norwegian data and exploiting the Norwegian school reform 
from 1960 in an instrumental variables approach. He finds no effect of additional education on 




We conduct a study similar to Milligan et al. (2004) and Pelkonen (2012) but in addition to an 
instrumental variables approach, we apply a staggered differences-in-differences approach in 
order to contribute to accumulating research on the relationship between education and voter 
turnout in Norway. We exploit the Norwegian school reform from 1960 that extended 
compulsory schooling from seven to nine years in both the instrumental variables approach and 
the staggered differences-in-differences approach. The Norwegian school reform is very 
attractive to researchers for several reasons: The reform was implemented at different times in 
different municipalities and is not systematically correlated with municipality specific 
characteristics. In addition, the reform increased compulsory schooling by two years, providing 
a large individual level variation in lower levels of educational attainment, relative to reforms 
exploited in other studies (Pelkonen, 2012). To the best of our knowledge, a study using the 
staggered differences-in-differences approach in this context has not been done before.  
 
Given the evidence presented in the similar studies by Milligan et al. (2004) and Pelkonen 
(2012), we expect no causal effect of education on voter participation. In Norway, as in the 
United Kingdom, there are no registration laws implying voting barriers. Consequently, 
education may not lower the cost of voting in Norway. The existence of registration laws would 
probably make education, providing relevant knowledge and skills to overcome such barriers, 
an important determinant of voting. If we find no causal effect, our study will supplement the 
research by Pelkonen (2012). 
 
The findings of this study show no causal effect of education on voter participation. These 
results are found using a staggered differences-in-differences approach on municipality level, 
controlling for municipality fixed effects, election year fixed effects and a linear time trend. 
Our robustness checks strengthen the internal validity of our model.  
 
The remainder of the paper continues as follows. We present background information on the 
school reform utilized, voting and registration, and compulsory schooling in section 2. Section 
3 presents relevant theoretical models, namely the absolute education model and the rational 
voter model.  In section 4 we provide a review of relevant previous literature. We describe our 
data in section 5, followed by a presentation of our empirical approach in section 6, including 
the empirical framework, a discussion of the randomness of the reform and the specification of 




Section 8 provides robustness checks of our main specification. In section 9 we discuss our 




2 Background Information 
To understand the context of the Norwegian school reform that we exploit in our analysis, we 
first shortly introduce information on compulsory schooling. Subsequently, we present 
background information on the reform. Last, we present information about voting and 
registration rules.  
 
2.1 Compulsory Schooling   
During the latter half of the 19th century, school reforms were carried out in many Western 
European countries (Murtin and Viarengo, 2011).2 Galor (2005) emphasizes the timing was not 
random: In the beginning of the industrial revolution, human capital had only a limited role in 
the production process. Education was motivated by various reasons, such as social control, 
religion, military control and moral conformity, and supply of public education differed 
between countries due to political, historical, cultural and institutional factors. In the second 
part of the industrial revolution, compulsory schooling was institutionalized, reflecting higher 
demand for skilled workers in the production process in many countries.  
 
2.2 Description of the Norwegian School Reform  
In 1959, the Norwegian Parliament legislated a mandatory school reform that increased the 
minimum level of education in society.3 The reform can be viewed as a political answer to the 
problems the Norwegian school system suffered after World War II. In particular, there were 
differences between the primary education provided in urban and rural parts of the country, 
social and regional differences in the intake to secondary schools and poor coordination 
between the different types of secondary education. The objective of the reform was to increase 
educational attainment, but also to reduce regional disparities and broaden access to further 
education (Lie, 1973).  
 
Prior to the reform, there were seven mandatory years of primary education. Thus, with a 
starting age of seven, students finished at the age of fourteen. In addition, a possibility to 
                                                
2 Most of the implemented school reforms extended compulsory schooling by one year or longer. Interestingly, 
reforms were undertaken by countries with different experiences and traditions in education policy.  




continue primary school in continuations schools was provided in some municipalities, lasting 
for one or two years. Secondary education was designed to prepare students for an academic 
education, lasting for three or five years. Commonly, secondary education was provided in 
central places and cities. Vocationally oriented schooling was also available, lasting for one or 
two years. The new comprehensive system increased the years of compulsory education from 
seven to nine years. The starting age was still seven years, but the finishing age was now sixteen 
years. Primary school now consisted of two parts: Lower primary school from class one to six, 
and higher primary school from class seven to nine. The curriculum of the two additional years 
concentrated on general education. This reflected increased demand for skilled workers, as in 
other countries with similar reforms (Lie, 1973, Pelkonen, 2012). 
  
The reform was to be implemented between 1955 and 1975. Originally the reform started as a 
designed experiment (forsøk), until it was made compulsory by the central government in 1970. 
4 Economic subsidies were provided to encourage adoption, primarily to even out differences 
between rich and poor municipalities. The reform implied drastic reorganizations. While some 
municipalities already had well developed school systems with secondary schools, others had 
nothing beyond the primary level. The Parliament recognized this variation in capacity, and 
gave the municipalities the liberty to decide exact timing themselves (Lie, 1973). As a result, 
although the reform was officially started in 1960, the implementation was not complete until 
1972 (Pelkonen, 2012). This implies that the Norwegian schooling system were divided in two 
separate systems during the implementation period. The system you were in depended on birth 
year, and which municipality you grew up in.  
 
The total set of birth cohorts that attended to education in the two different systems corresponds 
to birth cohorts 1946-1961 (See figure 1). The majority of the municipalities implemented the 
reform between 1961 and 1972, affecting birth cohorts 1947-1958. Our study is based on birth 
cohorts 1940-1958, in order to get variation in our data. The experiment municipalities are then 
also included. 
                                                
4 Twenty-eight municipalities experimented with a school model in the period 1955-1959, affecting birth cohorts 
1941-1945. The Norwegian word, "forsøk", which has no adequate English equivalent, is translated to 
"experiment" in its broadest meaning in this thesis. The model was a merger of the continuation school and lower 
secondary education. These municipalities can be viewed as the innovators of the reform, and politicians may have 
used this compromise action in order to gain wider support (Lie, 1973). Only a small number of schools were 










Source: Norwegian Centre for Research Data (NSD) 
 
The school reform we exploit inn our empirical study has been used several times in previous 
empirical research. Pelkonen (2012) utilize it in an instrumental variables approach, estimating 
the impact of education on voter turnout. Machin et al. (2012) used the reform to show that the 
length of compulsory education has a causal impact on labour mobility, whereas Black et al. 
(2005) utilized the reform in order to identify a causal intergenerational transmission of 
education from mothers to their children in Norway. Aakvik et al. (2010) measured private 
returns to education, and Black et al. (2008) found evidence that increased compulsory 





2.3 Voting and Registration 
The decision of voting is made within an institutional context. To understand this context, we 
will provide details on the voting system in Norway at the time our data were collected, and 
highlight how it differed from the system in the United States.  
 
The election system at National Elections in Norway was primarily regulated by The 
Constitution of Norway (Grunnloven) and The National Election Law (Stortingsvalgloven).5 
Everyone entitled to vote were automatically registered in a municipal register of electors in 
the municipality they were registered. In order to be entitled to vote, citizens had to fulfil the 
following requirements: You had to be registered as a Norwegian citizen, you had to reach the 
legal voting age by the end of the year and you could not have lost your right to vote (Tofte, 
1981). In 1979 the legal voting age was lowered from 20 to 18 years (Aardal, 2010).  It was 
important that the decision regarding locations and numbers of polling stations were taken in 
the electorates interest. The act of voting normally took place in the following manner: At the 
polling station, voters got a cross in the electoral register and were delivered a ballot paper. The 
voters then chose a polling booth where they voted privately and unobserved. Further, they 
folded their papers in order to keep their vote secret and put the paper into the ballot box (Tofte, 
1981). The election term was four years. The procedures of voting in Norway has not changed 
considerably since the time our data were collected. 
 
In contrast to the automatically registration in Norway, in the US, registration was an individual 
responsibility prior to election day. If a citizen moved, he or she had to re-register on the new 
address. Registration was often more difficult than the actual act of voting, usually involving 
obscure information and travelling at inconvenient times. Consequently, registration laws 
raised the cost of voting. However, each state determined its own registration laws, subject to 
limitations set by the court, the U.S. Constitution and national legislation. Taxes as a condition 
for registration, literacy tests, evening and Saturday registration, and required re-registration 
periodically are some examples of the regulations of registration from 1960 to 1973. Since the 
latter half of the 19th century there has been a broad liberalization in registration laws, lowering 
the cost of voting (Wolfinger and Rosenstone, 1980). However, despite substantial 
                                                
5 The fundamental principles of elections are given in The Constitution of Norway (Grunnloven) from 1814. More 
precise regulations regarding national elections are given in The National Election Law (Stortingsvalgloven) from 




improvements in balloting and registration procedures, registration laws are still an obstacle for 
voting in the United States, especially for young and low-income adults (Patterson, 2009). 
Difficult and complicated registration will matter mostly to citizens with low education because 





3 Theoretical Framework 
In this section, we will provide a theoretical framework for our analysis by describing the 
absolute education model and the rational voter model.   
 
3.1 The Absolute Education Model  
According to the absolute education model, education has a causal effect on political 
participation. What individuals learn at school positively affects cognitive ability such as civic 
skills and political knowledge, which function as the causal mechanisms triggering 
participation (Persson, 2015). Jackson (1995) argue that education in addition triggers 
individuals’ political efficacy since education increases the belief that they can play a role in 
the political process by having the competence to understand and participate, as well as an 
opportunity to influence government actions. According to the absolute education model, 
individuals are more likely to vote, the more education they have. The effects of education are 
independent of the level of education in the environment. Most of the literature supporting the 
view that education directly causes political participation does not present evidence on exactly 
how and through which mechanisms education affects participation. There is no evidence in 
the literature on whether the effect is linear or not. Some researchers argue that only higher 
education is an important determinant of participation (Persson, 2015). 
 
3.2 The Rational Voter Model 
Throughout the 1970s, the rational voter model became a popular model of voting. According 
to this model, electors decide to vote or not, and who to vote for, based on some rational basis, 
i.e. which action gives the greatest expected benefits. Only if they perceive greater benefits than 
costs from voting, they will vote (Niemi and Weisberg, 2001). Among other externalities, 
education has been shown to reduce the cost of voting. Education provides individuals with 
cognitive skills that make it easier to process complex information. Furthermore, education 
might improve the socioeconomic position of individuals, which in turn increase voter 
participation because such groups typically have a great interest in election outcomes. In 
addition, education might develop an acknowledgement of civic duty by fostering democratic 
beliefs and values, encouraging participation (Wolfinger and Rosenstone, 1980). Education can 




Doyle, 2008). However, few people decide to vote based on the belief that their vote will make 
a difference between a candidate´s victory and defeat. Rather, many voters are motivated by an 
instrumental benefit, meaning they are motivated by the effect of the act of voting on their own 
immediate wellbeing. Moreover, the marginal effect on the probability of voting is not constant 
across individuals. For individuals who are almost certain not to vote, the marginal effect of a 
variable is most likely very small. As the probability of voting increases, the marginal effect of 
costs and benefits also starts to increase. For individuals who are very certain to vote, the effect 
of additional benefits and costs on the probability of voting starts to diminish. Thus, individuals 
who are very certain on their decision regarding to vote or not, are relatively unaffected by 






4 Literature Review 
Education is frequently alleged to be an explanation of a person’s civic behaviour. Wolfinger 
and Rosenstone (1980) notes that educated people are more likely to express interest in politics 
and a high sense of citizen duty, follow political campaigns in the mass media and be well 
informed about politics. Similarly, Putnam (1995) states that “Education is by far the strongest 
correlate that I have discovered of civic engagement6 in all its forms, including social trust and 
membership in many different types of groups”. His analysis shows that education correlates 
exponentially with civic engagement in the United States. Going from a bachelor degree to a 
master degree makes U.S. citizens ten times more likely to engage in civic activity than going 
from the first to the fourth year in primary education. 
 
Individuals with higher education generally have a greater propensity to vote (Campbell et al., 
1960). They are also more likely to feel a sense of civic responsibility about voting, regardless 
of the cause and how small their vote is against the total number of casts. Wolfinger and 
Rosenstone (1980) found that education is the most important determinant of voter turnout 
adding income and occupational measures as control variables in their multiple regression 
model. They state that education can proxy for other unobservable characteristics like ability 
and family background. This will be the case if, in example, individuals with high ability or 
individuals who have grown up in a wealthy neighbourhood select into education and also tend 
to vote. Then, what seems to be the effect of education on voter turnout is really the effect of 
ability and family background. This is the case of selection bias. 
 
Several studies from the Unites States have attempted to answer why highly educated people 
have a higher voter participation. One explanation is that education gives the individuals 
knowledge and skills to surmount the barriers to participation, such as information about 
politics and the skills to deal with the bureaucracy of voting (Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993). 
Researchers have argued that it is the relative rather than the absolute education level that has 
implications for political participation. In other words, it is the individual’s level of education 
relative to the education level of the environment, rather than the skills provided by the 
                                                
6 Putnam (2001) refers to civic engagement as “people’s connections with the life of their communities, not 





education, that matters. Applying Swedish data, Persson (2011) finds supportive evidence of 
this. Verba et al. (1995) found that once political engagement was controlled for, the correlation 
between education and voter turnout disappeared. Political interest and partisanship was found 
to be especially strong predictors. This lead them to conclude that the effect of education on 
voting occurs through engagement. Interest further increases the likelihood for the individuals 
to acquire knowledge on political issues, and thus increases likelihood to vote (Tilley et al., 
2004). According to Campbell (2006), it is an individual’s involvement in the school 
community, rather than the formal curriculum, that influences the student’s decision to vote. 
Campbell (2008) shows that open classrooms lead to an increase in civic engagement. Open 
classrooms might foster exchange of ideas between the students, which strengthens the idea 
that the school community, in particular nature of the political discussion in the classroom, is 
what affects civic engagement.  
 
Most studies of political participation in western democracies are conducted using cross-
sectional data where the causal effect is difficult to isolate due to factors affecting both 
education and voter turnout (confounding factors), such as family background and individual 
ability. It might be that in previous research where education is shown to affect voter 
participation, education is a proxy for such factors. The causal link between education and voter 
participation is seldom directly investigated (Persson, 2015). Instead, some researchers attempt 
to explore the direct link from the confounding factors to voter participation. 
 
Pre-adult factors such as socioeconomic status and political socialization in the home 
environment might be predictors of political activity. With the civic voluntarism model, Verba 
et al. (1995) finds that activity enhancing factors such as resources and political engagement 
can be traced back to characteristics acquired at birth and early experiences in family and 
school, family social class being highly important. These factors are also associated with 
education. If these factors predict selection of individuals into education, education might be a 
proxy for such pre-adult factors in explaining political participation. 
 
Researchers have questioned whether voter turnout is affected by individual factors such as 
ability and personality rather than education, and that this can explain the underlying 
relationship between education and voter participation. Verba et al. (1995) states that skills 
relevant for politics are an outcome of education, rather than a proxy. They argue that 




especially the skills of speaking and writing. Luskin (1990) finds education to be unimportant 
and interest and intelligence to be highly important in predicting whether an individual is 
political sophisticated, described as his or her political cognition being numerous, complex and 
well organized. He applies a subjective opinion of the interviewer’s intelligence taken 
contemporaneously with the participation data. Here, misreporting might be an issue, and the 
measure of intelligence might therefore be unreliable. Denny and Doyle (2008) overcome this 
problem when modelling how education, ability and personality traits affects voter turnout in 
Britain using ability and personality measures taken of the respondents at a young age. 7 They 
are the first ones to include personality in modelling individual’s decision to vote. First, they 
find a correlation between education and voter participation when not controlling for ability 
and personality. They find a weaker relationship in Britain, compared to previous studies using 
American data. Further, their estimates show that cognitive ability and personality plays a larger 
role than education in determining voter turnout. Using ability and personality measures taken 
at a young age, they argue that their measures of ability better reflect innate rather than acquired 
ability and the personality measure reflect the true personality, hence overcoming the problem 
of misreporting. Since Denny and Doyle (2008) find that cognitive ability and personality has 
greater effect on voter participation than education, it suggests that ability and personality might 
be a proxy for education, rather than an outcome. In other words, voter participation might be 
affected by pre-adult factors that also correlates with education. This shows that omitting ability 
and personality seems to have caused bias in earlier research aiming to prove a causal link 
between education and voter participation. 
 
In order to make causal inference, the comparison of individuals who vote and do not vote must 
on average be ceteris paribus, i.e. all else equal. Failure to include all control variables that is 
correlated with both education and voter participation result in biased estimates. There is no 
guarantee that a relationship has a causal force even when regressions are insensitive to the 
inclusion of additional control variables (Angrist and Pischke, 2015). The ideal research design 
would be to randomly allocate individuals into different lengths of education. This could, 
however, never be implemented due to practically and ethically challenges (Persson, 2015). 
                                                
7 Denny and Doyle (2008) use a measure of cognitive ability based on a test which is taken at age 11, and argues 
that this measure in a better way reflects innate rather than acquired ability. The personality variable is based on 
evaluations the respondent’s teacher made when the respondents were 16 years old. The researchers argue that a 
personality measure taken at this age is likely to show the individual’s true personality since measures taken later 





More recent research utilizes sophisticated regression techniques in order to identify a causal 
relationship between education and civic participation, consequently isolating the effect of 
education. Dee (2004), Milligan et al. (2004) and Pelkonen (2012) apply an instrumental 
variables approach, in studies similar to ours. Dee (2004) uses variation in teen exposure to 
restrictive child labour laws as an instrument applying data from the General Social Surveys 
(GSS). He finds that one extra year of schooling increases voter participation by 6.8 percentage 
point in the United States. He finds that other measures of civic engagement, in particular 
newspaper readership, membership in groups and support of free speech, also are largely and 
positively affected by education. In addition, he investigates the effect of post-
secondary/college education on voter participation in the United States by utilizing distance to 
college as an instrument using data from High School and Beyond (HA&B), a major 
longitudinal study that contains interviews of a cohort that was high school sophomores in 1980. 
He finds that college entrance increases voter participation by 17 percentage points. However, 
the instruments that Dee (2004) utilizes might be problematic. Distance to college might be 
correlated with other variables affecting voter participation that are not measured. One such 
factor might be the parent’s circle of acquaintances. The change in child labour laws might not 
be a good instrument because it might not provide an exogenous variation in individual’s 
education level that is evenly spread out in the population. The change in child labour laws 
might affect individuals from low socio-economic background the most. Because of this, the 
estimates might be biased (Persson, 2015). Milligan et al. (2004) investigates the effect of extra 
schooling induced through increases in years of compulsory schooling on voter turnout in the 
United States and the United Kingdom. They exploit changes in compulsory attendance laws 
and child labour laws as instrument variables. The timing of the law changes within each state 
is unrelated to any individual characteristics that affects voting, conditional on state of birth, 
cohort of birth and election year, thus these instruments are better than the instruments applied 
by Dee (2004) in terms of causality. They use data from the annual National Election Studies 
and the November Voting Supplements to the Current Population Study for the US analysis, 
and the British General Election Studies and the Eurobarometer Surveys for the UK analysis 
Applying this instrument, they identify the local average treatment effect. In other words, they 
identify the effect for would-be-dropouts. In the US, the effect of education on voter turnout is 
found to be strong. When restricting the sample to include only registered citizens, the increase 
in voter turnout was minor in comparison to the whole sample. These findings lead them to 




registration laws act as a barrier to participation. Estimates for the United Kingdom, where there 
are no such registration barriers, show no similar effect of education on voter turnout. These 
findings emphasize the role of registration laws on voter turnout.   
 
The instrumental variables approach using increase in years of compulsory schooling is also 
applied in a study by Pelkonen (2012), to investigate the effect of education on voter 
participation and other civic activities in Norway. The reform implemented was not correlated 
to any socio-economic characteristic, thus the implementation appears to be quasi-random. It 
creates an exogenous shock in the individual’s level of schooling that is evenly spread in the 
population, coming close to the ideal randomization design. Pelkonen (2012) argues that the 
Norwegian reform is the most convincing compulsory schooling reform available to social 
scientists. This is the same school reform that we apply in our analysis. Pelkonen (2012) 
estimates the effect of education on voter participation and other civic outcomes using both 
individual and municipality level data. The data source for the individual level analysis is the 
National Election Studies interviewing random samples in correspondence to the five national 
elections in the years 1977 to 1993. The municipality level data source is the national Census 
of Norway from the years 1960, 1970 and 1980, and matching this to voting data from the 
Norwegian municipality database. He finds no effect of education on voter participation in 
either of the estimated models. Regarding other civic outcomes,8 only the effect on signing a 
petition was significant showing a positive effect of education. Persson (2015) argues that, 
given the solid research design, the results of no causal impact of education on voter 
participation is a “persuasive evidence” of the idea that education is a proxy for pre-adult 
characteristics. However, these empirical evidences are not able to confirm how education 
affects voter participation.  
                                                
8 Other civic outcomes that Pelkonen (2012) models in his analysis is: interested in politics, easy to decide a 
candidate, discuss politics, contacted representative, written a complaint, taken an issue to party/union, written in 





This section provides a description of the data material applied in the instrumental variables 
approach and in the staggered differences-in-differences approach, as well as challenges with 
the data.  
 
5.1 Data Applied in the Instrumental Variables Approach 
Our primary source of data is the National Election Surveys (NES) from 1977 and 1989 
prepared and made available by The Norwegian Centre for Research Data (NSD).9   
  
The NES provide information on whether the respondents voted or not in the Norwegian 
National Elections in 1977 and 1989. We have data on the dates the reform was implemented 
in each municipality, obtained by Black et al. (2005), and we link this to the National Election 
Surveys, in order to ascertain whether the respondents have been affected by the reform. The 
NES data only provide information on county level, thus we cannot tell which municipality the 
respondents grew up in. This makes us unable to state for certain whether the respondents have 
been directly affected by the reform. Still, we are able to create a probability of whether the 
respondents have been affected by the reform by constructing the share of individuals in each 
birth cohort in each county which were directly affected by the reform. This treatment intensity 
serves as our instrument for education.  
 
We include birth cohorts for the years 1940 to 1958. Using this many cohorts should provide 
us with a lot of variation in our dataset. Each individual is linked to their childhood county. 




                                                
9 We apply "Norwegian Election Study, 1977" and “Norwegian Election Study, 1989”. The surveys were financed 
by The Research Council of Norway and Kommunal- og Arbeidsdepartementet. Data are provided by Henry 
Valen, Bernt Aardal, Insitute for Social Research (ISF) and Statistics Norway (SSB), and prepared and made 
available by Norwegian Social Science Data Services (NSD). Neither Henry Valen, Bernt Aardal, Kommunal- og 




National Election Surveys 
The NES consists of a wide range of questions regarding voting behaviour, motivation for 
participation and political preferences. The sample is randomly selected from the population of 
Norwegians eligible to vote, ranging from age 18 to 79. The data is collected by personal 
interviews. The aim of the surveys is to study trends in the Norwegian politics and unique 
characteristics of the National Elections. NSD is one of the largest archives for research data in 
Norway and provides data to researchers and students both in Norway and internationally. 
 
There are two variables of particular interest: education and electoral register.  Summary 
statistics of these variables are provided in table 1. Education corresponds to years of schooling, 
ranging from primary to higher education. Details on the education variable is shown in table 
A1. The electoral register variable describes whether the respondents voted or not, 1 meaning 
voted. At election day, every person who voted was crossed off in the electoral register before 
he or she put the ballot paper in the ballot box. A common challenge with election surveys in 
general is the case of misreporting, since respondents may be reluctant to admit they did not 
vote (Milligan et al., 2004). By applying the electoral register, this challenge is not a problem 
to us.  
 
Figure 2 reveal that the more educated the respondents are, the higher the voter participation 
tends to be. In particular, the difference between respondents with seven and nine years of 
schooling is of interest. However, whether the increase in voter participation is a result of 
education or other factors, cannot be stated without further empirical research. 
 
Table 1: Summary Statistics of Education and Electoral Register 
 Observations Mean Standard deviation Min Max 
Education 1,102 12.226 3.311 7 24 
















5.2 Data Applied in the Staggered Differences-in-
Differences Approach 
The voting registry provided by NSD is our primary data source. For our main specification, 
we have panel data on Norwegian municipalities in the years of the National Elections every 
fourth year from 1953 to 1981. This contains number of votes and inhabitants eligible to vote, 
allowing us to calculate the share of eligible citizens that votes in each municipality, specified 
as voter participation. Summary statistics of the variable voter participation, grouped by 
election year is presented in table 2. We take into account that from 1953 to 1977, citizens were 
eligible to vote at the age of 20, whereas from the election in 1981 the legal voting age was 
lowered to 18 years. We link this information to data on when each municipality implemented 
the reform. Thus, we are able to identify whether there were citizens in the electorate of each 
municipality that had been enrolled in the reform. This allows us to analyse whether increased 
years of education had an impact on voter participation. The municipalities are specified 




Table 2: Summary Statistics of Voter Participation by Election Year 
Election Year Observations Mean Standard deviation  Min    Max 
1953 706 0.761 0.073 0.390 0.908 
1957 706 0.754 0.074 0.450 0.889 
1961 706 0.759 0.075 0.487 0.911 
1965 706 0.832 0.056 0.625 0.924 
1969 706 0.821 0.052 0.621 0.929 
1973 706 0.787 0.050 0.388 0.891 
1977 706 0.815 0.042 0.652 0.902 
1981 706 0.817 0.038 0.630 0.897 
 
 
Also, we have data from NSD on unemployment rates, taxable income per tax payer, voter 
participation by gender and inhabitants in each municipality that we use in order to separate our 
sample in the heterogeneity tests. Unemployment by definition is citizens actively searching 
for a job. For our robustness checks we add the data applied in our main specification for the 
National Elections in 1985 and 1989. For our event study we apply data on voter participation 
from the National Election in 1949.  
 
We do not have data on number of citizens in the years 1953, 1957 and 1961, which is solved 
by using population census from the corresponding decade. We assume the number of citizens 
is fairly stable over such a short time span, thus this should not be problem.  
 
5.3 Challenges 
26 municipalities implemented the reform during the merger of municipalities. We do not have 
data on the timing of the reform implementation of these municipalities, thus they are not 
included in the analysis. If these differ from the rest of the municipalities, not including them 
in our sample could lead to selection bias. However, these missing municipalities constitute a 
small share of the sample. A challenge of greater importance is that our data do not account for 






There are three challenges that are specific to the NES data. First, the NES data does not contain 
information on childhood county of 350 respondents. Therefore, we are unable to identify their 
treatment intensity and they are eliminated from our analysis. The majority of the eliminated 
observations are from the lower end of the educational distribution possibly indicating that any 
results using the NES data will suffer from selection bias. Second, individuals can decline the 
inquire to respond to the survey. In the NES from 1989 the response rate was 73.2 % of the 
drawn sample, while it was 72.5% in the NES from 1977. If the individuals that refuse to 
respond differ from the rest of the sample by characteristics that determine voter participation 
and are correlated to education, the problem of selection bias arises. We do not have the 
opportunity to test this. Third, since we are estimating the effect of an increase from seven to 
nine years of education induced by the reform, we might meet a challenge of finding an effect 
because there are few respondents with only seven years of education. In other words, there are 





6 Empirical Approach 
In this section, we provide a theoretical overview of the empirical framework relevant for our 
analysis, followed by a discussion of the randomness of the reform and a presentation of our 
models.  
 
6.1 Empirical Framework 
In order to estimate the effect of education on voter participation, the method of ordinary least 
squares (OLS) that minimizes the sum of squared residuals, can be applied. This tells us how 
the expected average value of political participation changes with an increase in compulsory 
schooling. The causal effect is obtained when comparing the treatment and the control group 
ceteris paribus, all else equal. This is best achieved with random assignment of individuals into 
the treatment and control group. The crucial assumption for causal inference, zero conditional 
mean, is then satisfied.10  Due to practical and ethical reasons, random assignment of individuals 
into different lengths of education is impossible. When individuals with certain characteristics 
that determines the outcome of interest are more likely to select into education than others, the 
problem of selection bias arises. Hence, variables correlated with both the dependent and the 
independent variable are left in the error term. Examples of such variables are ability, family 
background and environmental factors. The OLS estimator will then suffer from omitted 
variable bias, causing the problem of endogenous independent variables in the regression 
model. Thus, when estimating the effect of education on voter participation using OLS, we are 
only able to estimate the correlation, not the causal effect (Wooldridge, 2014).  
 
In order to overcome the problem of selection bias, and thus estimate the causal effect of 
education on voter participation, we apply the method of instrumental variables and the method 
of staggered differences-in-differences as our identification strategies. We apply these methods 
exploiting the staged Norwegian school reform that extended the years of compulsory schooling 
from seven to nine. This created an exogenous shock in level of schooling, which enables the 
application of our identification strategies. In addition, compared to reforms exploited in other 
studies, this Norwegian school reform provides a large individual level variation in lower levels 
                                                
10 The zero conditional mean assumption states that the error term must be normally distributed with a mean value of zero and 
the average value of error term must not depend on the value of the independent variable, ! " # = 0. In addition, causal 




of educational attainment. Finally, it was implemented at different times across different 
municipalities.  
 
Method of Instrumental Variables 
The method of instrumental variables (IV) can be applied in order to solve the problem of the 
endogenous explanatory variables in OLS regressions, hence leaving us with the causal effect. 
Simply put, the IV approach leaves the unobserved variable in the error term, but still 
recognizes the presence of it. The simple regression is in general written as 
 
' = () + (+# + " 
 
In order to obtain consistent estimates of () and  (+ we need a new variable, ,, that satisfies the 
following two assumptions,  
 
(1) , is uncorrelated with " :		./0 ,, " = 0 
(2) , is correlated with #: ./0(,, #) ≠ 0 
 
where , is the instrument variable for #. When assumption (1) is satisfied, we often refer to 
instrument exogeneity, meaning that , have no partial effect on	' and is uncorrelated with the 
error term. This assumption cannot be tested, but must be argued with economic behaviour and 
theory. Satisfaction of assumption (2) is referred to as instrument relevance, meaning that , is 
correlated with the endogenous variable #, thus relevant in explaining variation in #. This 
assumption can be tested, given a random sample from the population, simply by regressing	# 
on ,,  
 
# = 	5) + 5+, + 0 
 
Only if there is a correlation between the instrument variable and the endogenous variable, 5+ ≠
0, instrument relevance is obtained. Both instrument relevance and instrument exogeneity must 







As a second approach to estimate the causal effect of education on voter participation, we utilize 
a staggered differences-in-differences (DID) setup. This method is previously explored by, 
among others, Akerman et al. (2015) and Bütikofer et al. (2015). We exploit the rollout of the 
Norwegian school reform that increased compulsory education by two years. Rollout refers to 
the reform being implemented at different times in different municipalities across the country. 
This is an advanced form of the DID approach. In order to explain the staggered DID setup, we 
find it useful to first deduce the DID approach.  
 
The DID approach is based on exploring the differences in outcome between a treatment and a 
control group, where the treatment hits the whole treatment group simultaneously. The ideal 
control group is the true counterfactual to the treatment group, that is the treated group in the 
absence of treatment (the outcome of the treated group in the absence of treatment is referred 
to as potential outcome of the treatment group). In our case that would be the children that were 
affected by the reform had they not been affected by the reform. However, this is impossible 
since the true counterfactual is not observable. Instead, the DID approach is based on comparing 
the treatment group to a control group that displays what would have happened to the treatment 
group in the absence of treatment. The crucial assumption is that the treatment group would 
follow the same trend in outcome as the control group, in the absence of treatment. Thus, the 
control group creates a path that displays the potential outcome of the treated group. A post-
treatment divergence from the path would indicate a treatment effect (Angrist and Pischke, 
2015).  
 
The deduction of the DID approach in its simplest form can be displayed using the following 
framework: D = 1 denotes the treatment group and D = 0 denotes the control group. Y(0) is the 
outcome variable at time 6 = 0 while Y(1) is the outcome variable at time 6 = 1. Y1 is the 
outcome Y when treatment has occurred, while Y0 is the outcome in the absence of treatment. 
 
We want to estimate ! 8+ 1 − 8: 1 ; = 1 . This is the difference between the outcome and 
the potential outcome of the treated group, indicating a treatment effect. 
Since	 8) 1 ; = 1  is unobserved, the estimator of interest is derived in the following manner: 
 
! 8+ 1 − 8: 1 ; = 1 = {! 8 1 ; = 1 − ! 8 1 ; = 0 } 




This is illustrated in figure 3.  
 














Source: Angrist and Pischke (2015) 
 
The staggered DID approach follows the same idea as the basic DID approach, comparing 
treatment and control subjects. The difference is that here, all subjects are exposed to treatment 
during the relevant period, but at different times. The approach exploits the variation in the 
timing of treatment, allowing for findings of an average treatment effect. The control group 
consists of subjects that at a given time during the research period had not received treatment. 
The treatment group consists of subjects that had received treatment at that same point in time. 
In order to ensure internal validity of the staggered DID setup, the key assumption is that the 
timing of treatment is uncorrelated to other determinants of the outcome variable. In other 
words, the reform implementation must be random. For example, this assumption would be 
violated if the richest municipalities implemented the reform earlier than the poorest. When this 
assumption holds, the control group works on average as a good counterfactual for the treated 
group. In other words, each election year those municipalities that have implemented the reform 
are comparable to those municipalities that have not yet implemented the reform. For example, 
if reform implementation is random with respect to income in the municipality, it ensures that 
the treatment and control group are similar in terms of income. 
![8+(1) − 8:(1)|; = 1] 
![8(1)|; = 1] 
![8(1)|; = 0] 
 
![8(0)|; = 1] 
 
![8(0)|; = 0] 
 
![8)(1)|; = 1] 
 




Linear Probability Model 
When testing the robustness of our results, we estimate the probability of high voter 
participation in the municipalites. To perform this analysis, we utilize a linear probability model 
(LPM). The LPM lets us explain a binary outcome, that is when the dependent variable takes 
the values of zero and one. This enables us to explain a qualitative event. In the case of the 
LPM, it is always true that A ' = 1 # = !('|#), the probability that ' = 1 is the same as the 
expected value of '. This gives: 
 
A ' = 1 # = () + (+#+ + ⋯+ (C#C 
 
The probability that the explanatory variable is one, is a linear function of the #D. This is 
conditional on assuming that the zero conditional mean assumption holds. The mechanisms of 
the OLS are still as explained above. The coefficients (D are interpreted as the probability that 
the outcome variable ' = 1 when the #D changes holding other factors fixed, in other words the 
probability of “success”.  
ΔA ' = 1 # = (DΔ#D 
 
Thus, the LPM measures the predicted difference in probability relative to the base group.  
 
There are two shortcomings of the LPM. First, predictions that are either less than zero or 
greater than one are problematic to interpret, since probabilities can only take on values between 
one and zero. Second, a probability cannot be linearly related to the independent variables for 
all possible values. Third, there must be heteroscedasticity in a LPM, except in the case where 
the probability does not depend on any of the independent variables. This does not lead to bias 
in the estimates, but it leads the standard errors to be invalid in general (Wooldridge, 2014).  
 
Clustering 
A municipality-year panel consists of repeated observations of municipalities over time, raising 
the issue of serial correlation. Serially correlated data are persistent, meaning that values of 
variables close to each other in time are likely to be similar. This will be the case if the error 
terms of the municipalities correlate from one period to the next. In example, if voter 
participation is high one year, it is likely to be high in the next year. It is likely that ignoring 




errors. The solution is to apply clustered standard errors. By clustering on group level, we allow 
for correlation within group (Angrist and Pischke, 2015). Thus, by clustering on municipality 
level, any serial correlation within each municipality is taken care of.  
 
 
6.2 Reform Randomness 
As presented in the previous section, valid results in the IV approach depend on the exogeneity 
assumption, whereas in the DID approach, it depends on that the timing of the reform 
implementation is random with respect to determinants of voter participation. The crucial 
question in order to ensure that these assumptions are fulfilled is to ask whether the treatment 
group differ from the control group in factors determining the outcome. In other words, if those 
who went through the old education system is different from those who went through the new 
education system with respect to determinants of voter participation, the problem of selection 
bias arises. Although we can never test whether these assumptions are completely satisfied, 
checking for a correlation between reform implementation and observable characteristics of the 
municipalities gives indicative evidences. 
 
Lie (1973) finds no apparent relationship between reform implementation and municipality 
characteristics such as taxable income, average earnings and education levels.  Black et al. 
(2005) examine this issue further by regressing the year of reform implementation on 
municipality averages in background variables including parental income, level of education, 
average age, fraction of individuals with less than nine years of schooling, urban/rural status, 
industry and labour force composition, municipality unemployment rates in 1960 and the share 
of individuals who were members of the Labour Party. The researchers find evidence of no 
systematic correlation between reform implementation and these background variables. 
Furthermore, Pelkonen (2012) finds evidence supporting the randomness assumption when 
regressing the number of years that it took the municipalities to implement the reform on socio-
economic and political factors, including proportions of municipality representatives of the five 
largest parties and political affiliation of the mayors.  
 
However, it is challenging to fully test the randomness since some factors can be difficult to 
measure. Factors describing political interest and decision making can be difficult to find data 




factors, but these do probably not sufficiently capture all features of political interest and 
political decision making. Ability is commonly known as a source of selection bias when 
estimating the effect of education. Both Black et al. (2005) and Pelkonen (2012) finds that the 
timing of the reform implementation is uncorrelated to level of education prior to reform 
implementation. Level of education can work as a proxy for ability, but it is debatable whether 
this is satisfactory. These are examples of that randomness is difficult to measure. 




6.3 Our Model 
 
6.3.1 Model I: IV 
Our first model applied to measure the effect of education on voter participation, is an 
instrumental variables approach. We exploit the Norwegian school reform that extended the 
years of compulsory schooling from seven to nine. The reform provides exogenous variation in 
education. We follow a similar approach as Pelkonen (2012) who utilize this reform to study 
the effect of education on voter participation using an instrumental variables approach.  
We estimate the following model:  
 
8FG = 	H + (!I"JK6L/MF + N!OPJ6L/M'PKQG + 5;RS + T;S + UFG																												 1  
 
where 8FG represent our outcome variable voter participation for individual L at time 6. 
!I"JK6L/MF is the total number of years the individual attended school. The model controls for 
!OPJ6L/M'PKQG which indicates the year of the National Election, year of birth dummies (;RS) 
that controls for birth cohort fixed effects and childhood county dummies (;S) that controls for 
county fixed effects. Thus, year specific shocks and unobserved time invariant factors in each 
county are controlled for. An example of a year specific shock is a widespread pandemic hitting 
the population in a specific year, whereas an example of county fixed effects is geographical 
features. Failing to control for such factors would lead to omitted variable bias if they correlate 





In this model, !I"JK6L/MF might be endogenous if there are variables correlated with education 
that also affects voter participation, 8FG. If this is the case, ( will be biased. To overcome this, 
we apply the instrumental variables approach instrumenting !I"JK6L/MF with VM6PMWL6'FG. The  
VM6PMWL6'FG variable is constructed using the Norwegian school reform. Pelkonen (2012), Black 
et al. (2005), Black et al. (2008) and Machin et al. (2012) also exploit this reform to construct 
instrument variables.  
 
The estimated first stage is: 
 
!I"JK6L/MF = X + YVM6PMWL6'FG + Z!OPJ6L/M'PKQG + [;RS + \;S + ]FG																					(2) 
 
VM6PMWL6'FG indicates the share of individuals in each birth cohort in each county that have 
enrolled in school for two more years due to the reform. This can be interpreted as the likelihood 
that individual L has been affected by the reform. In the first stage of the instrumental variables 
model (equation 2), Y shows how much an increase in the probability that the individual has 
gone through the reform increases years of education. 
 
Our variable of interest is !I"JK6L/MF, and the estimate ( shows the causal effect of education 
on voter participation. Given that we control for municipality fixed effects, and the indicative 
evidence of no correlation between reform implementation and municipality characteristics 
described in section 6.2, we argue that this assumption is met.  
 
In general, the IV measures the effect of compliers, whose outcome is solely determined by 
their treatment status, that is whether they were treated or not. In our analysis, compliers are 
those whose number of years in school is determined by whether they were affected by the 
reform or not. In the absence of the reform, they would drop out after seven years in school, but 
when affected by the reform, they complete nine years of education.   
 
The Effect of the Compulsory Schooling Law on Education 
The first stage (ref. Equation 2) tests the relevance assumption, that the reform had an impact 
on educational attainment. Previous research by Black et al. (2005), Black et al. (2008) and 
Machin et al. (2012) show statistical significant evidence of this. However, we do not find a 




adding control variables. Thus, relevance assumption is not fulfilled. The results are shown in 
table 3.  
 
 
Table 3: First Stage 
 (1) (2) 




Year of birth fixed effects 
 
No Yes 







N 1102 1102 
Note: The dependent variable is education. Intensity is the instrument, indicating the share of individuals in each 
birth cohort in each county that have enrolled in school for two more years due to the reform. Included birth cohorts 
are 1940 to 1958. The data includes election years 1977 and 1989.  Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard 
errors are clustered on childhood county level. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
 
It can be beneficial to narrow the focus on the lower end of the educational distribution, since 
this is where most of the change took place. We run the first stage (ref. Equation 2) when 
excluding respondents with more than twelve years of schooling, i.e. higher education. We must 
acknowledge the possibility that some individuals when pushed to nine years would attend to 
higher education even if they would not in the absence of the reform. It may be that these 
individuals exit the sample. If these individuals are more likely to vote, the results would suffer 
from a downward bias (Pelkonen, 2012). The results, shown in table A2, are similar to when 
applying the unrestricted sample, there is no statistical significant relationship. 
 
The insignificant results might be due to that our sample consists of few respondents with only 
seven years of education prior to reform implementation, which makes it difficult to estimate 
the effect of two additional years of education induced by the reform (ref. table A1). A possible 
improvement to our model would be to include more data by adding several election years. This 
would give us a larger sample and possibly more variation in the data. However, this is not 
feasible because our model requires information on the respondents that are not available for 





Since our instrument does not fulfil the relevance condition, it is not a valid instrument and 
cannot be applied further in the instrumental variables approach. Thus, the application of the 
IV model will not proceed any further in our analysis.  
 
6.3.2 Model II: Staggered DID 
Main Specification 
Our second identification strategy to measure the effect of education on voter participation, is 
a staggered DID approach. This setup is inspired by Akerman et al. (2015) and Bütikofer et al. 
(2015). Increased education is identified as extended years of compulsory schooling by the 
Norwegian school reform.  We exploit that the rollout of the reform took place at different times 
in different municipalities. The control group is the municipalities that at a point in time had 
not yet implemented the reform, and the treatment group is the municipalities that had 
implemented the reform at that time. 
 
We estimate the following model: 
 
8_G = H + N`Pa/Qb_G + T;_ + 5;G + ρ6 + U_G																																				(3) 
 
Where 8_G is our dependent variable, voter participation, which is the share of citizens who 
voted of all citizens eligible to vote in municipality b at time 6. ̀ Pa/Qb_G is equal to 1 if there 
are citizens in the electorate who have been enrolled in the reform, and equal to 0 otherwise. In 
other words, individuals must be born late enough to have been enrolled, and early enough to 
be eligible to vote.  
 
;_ and ;G is a set of dummies, controlling for municipality fixed effects and election year fixed 
effects. Thus, time invariant unobserved factors specific to each municipality and shocks 
specific to the election years are controlled for. If we fail to control for such factors, and they 
are correlated to the outcome variable, voter participation, the model will suffer from omitted 
variable bias. By including 6, we control for a linear time trend.  
 
`Pa/Qb_G is our variable of interest, and ( represents the causal effect of the treatment. 
Random rollout of the reform is required for causal interpretation. Since we control for 




and time constant municipality characteristics should be taken care of. Moreover, evidence of 
no systematic correlation between timing of reform implementation and several municipality 





In the following section results from our staggered DID analysis is presented. First, we present 
our findings from the main specification, where we regress voter participation on reform 
implementation in all municipalities (ref. equation 3). Subsequently, we investigate 
heterogeneity effects by dividing the sample by gender, rural areas, taxable income per tax 
payer and unemployment rate.  
 
7.1 Main Specification 
Table 4 presents the estimated effect of education on voter participation. The dependent 
variable is voter participation. Voter participation is specified as a share of the number of votes 
to the total electorate. There are eight observations per municipality, corresponding to the 
election years every fourth year from 1953 to 1981.  Each column represents a separate 
regression and each coefficient represents the change in voter participation from the increase in 
years of education induced by the change in the compulsory schooling law. Standard errors are 
robust and clustered by municipality, allowing for correlation within the municipalities.  
 
Column 1 presents the effect of education on voter participation, when not including 
municipality fixed effects, election year fixed effects nor a linear time trend. The estimate is 
significant and positive, indicating that voter participation increases as years of education is 
increased. As the reform is implemented, voter participation increase by 2.78 percentage points. 
When controlling for municipality fixed effects, election year fixed effects and a linear time 
trend, there is no longer a significant effect. This is shown in column 2. Consequently, the effect 
in column 1 likely suffers from omitted variable bias, thus the estimate is not trustworthy.  
 
Column 3 presents the relationship between compulsory schooling and voter participation when 
not controlling for municipality fixed effects. Consequently, time invariant municipality 
characteristics are left in the error term. Compared to our main specification in column 2, the 
estimate changes from negative to positive, but is still insignificant.  Hence, municipality 







Table 4: Voter Participation Using the Full Sample (Baseline Estimates) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Reform 0.0278*** -0.00272 0.00569 
 (0.00158) (0.00203) (0.00307) 
    
Municipality 
fixed effects 
No Yes No 
    
Election Year 
fixed effects  
No Yes Yes 
    
Time No Yes Yes 
    
N 5648 5648 5648 
Note: The dependent variable is voter participation which is the number of votes as a share of  
the total electorate in each municipality. Column 2 is our main specification. There are eight  
observations per municipality, corresponding to the election years every fourth year from 1953 
to 1981. Robust standard errors in parentheses. All standard errors are clustered on municipality 
level. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
 
We estimate the intention-to-treat (ITT) effect. In our analysis, every citizen who voted is 
included and we cannot state for certain how many of these individuals were affected by the 
reform. There can be various reasons that children might not complete the compulsory years of 
schooling, such as sickness, death or simply by choice. It is only the intention to treat that has 
been randomly assigned to the different municipalities, not whether the person actually enrols 
in the school. We therefore estimate the effect on average across individuals with higher and 
lower likelihood of enrolling in education.  
 
7.2 Heterogeneity  
Gender  
Level of education increased in general in Norway after the 1960s, but especially for women 
(Jensen, 2000). Our hypothesis is that extended compulsory schooling may have had a greater 
impact on women than men.  We therefore divide our sample by gender in order to investigate 




presented in table 5, column 1 and 2. The effect of education on voter participation is negative 
and insignificant on a 5% level for both men and women, as in our main specification. 
Consequently, we cannot state that education induces an increase in voter participation for 
neither women nor men. We note that the estimate is significant on a 10% level for women. 
However, this estimate is not sufficiently trustworthy because of its small value and weak 
significance.   
  
Rural areas  
The provision of education prior to the reform varied between urban and rural areas. Typically, 
secondary education was provided in cities and central places. The reform made nine years of 
schooling compulsory in all municipalities, implying increased access to schools on a national 
basis (Lie, 1973, Machin et al., 2012). It is therefore reasonable to believe that the reform 
implied a more drastically change in the provision of education in rural areas than in urban 
areas, possibly leading to a bigger impact of extended compulsory schooling in rural areas.  
 
We investigate the effect of education on voter participation in rural areas (see table 5, column 
3). We define rural areas as all areas except the five biggest cities in terms of inhabitants in 
Norway in the relevant time period, hence excluding Oslo, Bergen, Stavanger, Trondheim and 
Bærum. This identification of rural areas is not perfectly adequate because it does not capture 
factors such as infrastructure and industry structure. Unfortunately, we do not have data 
available which would better capture these factors. The findings are similar to our main 
specification, that there is a negative and insignificant effect of education on voter participation. 
Thus, we cannot state that education has an effect on voter participation in rural areas. We 
choose not to restrict our sample to urban areas due to few observations.  
  
Economic Situation and Unemployment  
There are competing claims in the literature on how economic stress affects voter turnout. One 
point of view is that economic stress increase political participation because people blame 
politicians for their situation, creating civic engagement (Schlozman and Verba, 1979). In 
contrast, Brody and Sniderman (1977) found that those facing personal economic problems 
have a lower voter participation than those facing other problems in the United States. The 
researchers argue that people who experience economic difficulty as an acute personal concern 




found that in the United States Presidential Election in 1972, the poor and unemployed were 
less likely to vote. Rosenstone (1982) found that voter turnout is lower when short-term 
unemployment is high, based on the Presidential Election in 1974.  
 
We find it interesting to investigate whether education affects voter participation differently in 
rich and poor municipalities. We use taxable income per tax payer as a proxy for the economic 
situation of the inhabitants in each municipality. Unfortunately, we do not have satisfying data 
on taxable income for all years in the relevant time period. Thus, we operate with taxable 
income in 1974 in our proxy variable. We divide our sample by quartiles. The results are 
presented in table 6, column 1-4. We find that in the poorest municipalities (first quartile), 
education decreases voter participation by 1.11 percentage points. We note that the sample size 
is smaller and the standard errors higher than in our main specification. In richer municipalities 
we find no significant effects of education on voter participation, similar to our main 
specification.  
 
Based on the existing literature, it seems reasonable to acknowledge that education might have 
different effects on voter turnout in municipalities with different rates of unemployment. We 
therefore want to investigate whether there is a different effect of education on voter 
participation in municipalities with relatively high and low unemployment. Unemployment is 
per definition citizens actively searching for a job, accordingly it does not capture all individuals 
without a job. We define high and low unemployment rates as share of unemployment above 
and below mean, respectively. The results are presented in table 6, column 4 and 5. We find 
similar effects as in our main specification regarding municipalities with an unemployment rate 
below mean. However, there is a significant negative effect of education in municipalities with 
an unemployment rate above mean. The estimate indicates that education, identified through 
extended years of compulsory schooling, induces a decrease in voter participation of 1.22 
percentage points in municipalities with relatively high unemployment. We note that the sample 
size is smaller and that the standard errors increase somewhat when restricting the sample to 








Table 5: Voter Participation When the Sample is Restricted to Men, Women and Rural Areas 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Men Women Rural 
Reform -0.000834 -0.00433 -0.00246 
 
 
(0.00231) (0.00237) (0.00204) 
N 5648 5648 5608 
Note: The dependent variable is voter participation. All regressions control for municipality fixed  
effects, election year fixed effects and a linear time trend (main specification). The sample is restricted  
to men and women,and rural areas (cities excluding Oslo, Bergen, Trondheim, Stavanger and Bærum).  
There are eight observations per municipality, corresponding to the election years every fourth year  
from 1953 to 1981.Robust standard errors in parentheses. All standard errors are clustered on  









Table 6: Voter Participation When the Sample is Restricted to Quartiles of Taxable Income and Unemployment Above and Below Mean 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 




Reform -0.0111* -0.000716 0.00229 0.00169 -0.0122* -0.000182 
 
 
(0.00546) (0.00409) (0.00310) (0.00300) (0.00517) (0.00254) 
N 1352 1352 1360 1584 2095 3553 
Note: The dependent variable is voter participation. All regressions control for municipality fixed effects, election year fixed effects and a linear time trend (main 
specification). The sample is restricted to quartiles of taxable income per tax payer and unemployment above and below mean. There are eight observations per municipality, 
corresponding to the election years every fourth year from 1953 to 1981. Robust standard errors in parentheses. All standard errors are clustered on municipality level. 








8 Robustness Checks 
In order to verify the robustness of our findings, we perform several specification checks on 
our main analysis. If these tests give the same results as our main specification, it strengthens 
the internal validity of our main specification. First, we perform a test on the exogeneity of the 
reform implementation by performing an event study. Second, we test whether the baseline 
estimates are robust to the inclusion of two more election years. Third, we allow for non-linear 
form of voter participation by applying a quadratic time trend to the regression. Furthermore, 
we add share of unemployment as a control variable. Last, we re-specify the dependent variable 
to a dummy variable that indicates high and low voter participation. 
 
Event Study 
The key assumption for the DID identification strategy is that the implementation of the reform 
is not correlated to any characteristics of the municipality, in other words that it is random. In 
section 6.2, suggestive evidences of such randomness is presented. However, we want to test 
this assumption further by checking for correlation between the timing of reform 
implementation across municipalities and lead values of our variable of interest, voter 
participation. We apply voter participation in 1949 as our dependent variable. This National 
Election was accordingly held prior to reform implementation. This gives us a further indication 
of whether the assumption of random rollout of the reform holds. The result is shown in table 
A3. We find a statistically significant and weak negative correlation. In fact, the effect is close 
to zero, and we therefore consider this as further evidence of the exogeneity of the reform 
implementation. 
 
Extending the Data by Two Election Years 
We extend our analysis by including data on the election years 1985 and 1989. By doing this, 
we investigate whether the baseline estimates in table 4 are robust when a larger share of the 
electorate has been affected by the reform. The results when using the extended data set are 
presented in table A4. The estimated coefficient showing the effect of education on voter 
participation (column 1) is a little larger than the baseline estimates. The estimate of our main 
specification (column 2) is slightly smaller but still insignificant, strengthening the results of 
not finding a causal relationship between education and voter participation. Accordingly, 




Quadratic Time Trend 
By including a quadratic time trend to our main specification, we test whether the functional 
form of the regression model is specified correctly. We then allow for a non-linear time trend 
in voter participation in the data. Observing figure A1, showing the mean of voter participation 
by election year, we suspect that the development of voter participation over time might be non-
linear. The result is presented in table A5, column 1. The estimate is similar to results from our 
main specification, and we therefore conclude that no such trend affects the development of 
voter participation.  
 
We could also control for municipality specific time trend, but this would eliminate much of 
the variation in our data. We therefore do not find this expedient. 
 
Controlling for Unemployment 
We want to check the robustness of our analysis by including share of unemployment as a 
control variable. Sørensen (2015) studied the relationship between unemployment and voter 
turnout in her master thesis, and found that unemployment has a negative effect on voter 
participation in Norway. It is reasonable to believe that unemployment is also correlated to 
education. The result from the regression controlling for share of unemployment is presented 
in table A5, column 2. The result strengthens the findings from our main specification. Since 
municipality fixed effects are included in our main specification, time invariant factors specific 
to each municipality are controlled for. From figure A2, we see that the share of unemployment 
varies over time. However, the variation is very small. This suggests that unemployment is 
controlled for by fixed effects, and this might be the reason that the regression controlling for 
unemployment is similar to our main specification. 
 
Re-specification of the Dependent Variable 
We re-specify the dependent variable to a dummy variable that indicates high and low voter 
participation, measured as the mean across all municipalities. Consequently, we investigate 
whether there is a higher probability of attaining high voter participation when the electorate 
consists of citizens affected by the reform, applying the same data material. We consider a mean 
of 80% as a threshold for high voter participation. In figure A1, we observe that in the National 
Election in 1973 the mean of voter participation increased somewhat and stabilized above 80 




figure 1).11 We regress a threshold of high voter participation on the same independent variables 
as in the main specification, utilizing a linear probability model.  
  
We estimate the following model:  
 
!ℎ#$%ℎ&'()* = , + ./$0&#1)* + 23) + 43* + ρ6 + 7)*																									(4) 
 
The dependent variable !ℎ#$%ℎ&'()* is a dummy variable indicating whether the municipality 
was above or below 80 percent voter participation at time 6. The independent variables are the 
same as in our main specification.  
 
Table A6 presents the results of this model that is the estimate of the probability of a voter 
participation above 80 percent in each municipality, as an effect of education. The relationship 
between reform implementation and high voter participation in the municipalities is significant 
and positive when not including control variables, indicating that reform implementation 
increased the probability of high voter participation. When controlling for municipality fixed 
effects, election year fixed effects and a linear time trend, the estimate is negative and 
insignificant. Thus we are not able to state a causal effect of education on the probability of 
attaining at least 80 percent voter turnout. The results correspond to the findings from our main 
specification, supporting the conclusion of not stating a causal relationship between compulsory 
schooling and voter participation. 
                                                
11 All individuals born between 1941 and 1953 had been affected by the reform at the National Election in 1973. 





In the following, we will provide a discussion of our results and limitations of our analysis. 
 
9.1 Discussion of the Results from our Main Specification 
In our analysis, we estimate the intention-to-treat (ITT) effect of education on voter 
participation in Norway. The result from our main specification is statistically insignificant, 
and robust to several specification checks. Based on this evidence, we find no causal 
relationship between education and voter participation in Norway. This corresponds to findings 
by Pelkonen (2012) and Milligan et al. (2004) who finds no effect of education on voter 
participation in respectively Norway and the United Kingdom. However, our evidence goes 
against the vast majority of research, especially in the U.S., and stands in contrast to the absolute 
voter model.  
 
Previous studies have faced difficulty in estimating the causal effect. Generally speaking, 
people tend to select into education. More educated people might also be more keen voters. 
This might lead to selection bias, possibly revealing the positive relationship between education 
and voter participation that so many researchers have claimed. If this is the case, estimating the 
causal effect should show a weaker or no effect. Since we utilize an exogenous increase in 
education, we are able to eliminate selection bias from our analysis. This might explain why 
we find no relationship between education and voter participation. Our estimates reveal that 
other municipality characteristics than access to the school reform seem to have an impact on 
voter participation.  
 
In contrast to the insignificant results found in Norway and the United Kingdom, Milligan et 
al. (2004) found that education increases voter participation in the United States causally. The 
different results can possibly be attributed to the differences in the election systems where the 
U.S. citizens faces registration rules, while there are no similar rules that apply in Norway (see 
section 2) or in the United Kingdom. Registration rules has been presented as a barrier to voter 
participation, making it cumbersome for the electorate to vote. Thus, in relation to the rational 
voter model, registration rules can be considered a cost to participation (Wolfinger and 
Rosenstone, 1980). The positive relationship in the U.S. discovered by Milligan et al. (2004) 




to overcome the registration barriers. Thus, education can contribute to lowering the costs of 
participation and increasing voter turnout in countries with such voting barriers. Furthermore, 
the rational voter model suggest that education can contribute to increased perceived benefits 
of voting by inducing acknowledgement of civic duty. Our result is evidence against such a 
mechanism in Norway. It is possible that education does not lead to an acknowledgement of 
civic duty for Norwegian citizens, and accordingly does not increase their perceived benefits. 
On the other hand, education might lead individuals to acknowledge their civic duty, but still 
they do not experience any increase in perceived benefits from voting. In other words, increased 
acknowledgement of civic duty might not be a mechanism leading them to vote. The Norwegian 
electorate might not have perceived their vote as particularly important since Norway had a 
well-functioning and stable democracy, hence they did not experience increased benefits from 
voting. 
 
A possible explanation of our null result in this study is that two additional years of compulsory 
education might not be a sufficient amount of schooling to affect voter participation. In relation 
to the rational voter model, it might be the case that many individuals are very certain on their 
decision on whether to vote or not. They might therefore be relatively unaffected by possibly 
small changes in costs and benefits induced by the two years of education. In addition, Pelkonen 
(2012) suggests that additional education affects voting differently, depending on education 
level. Based on reported voter turnout by self-reported years of education, it is shown that 
additional education has the biggest impact on voting at the very lowest, and possibly at the 
highest level of education. According to Putnam (1995), there is an exponential relationship 
between education and voter participation. Since the reform affected students at the lower end 
of the educational distribution, there might not be an effect. The reform implied not only a 2-
year increase, but an increase from 7-9 years. A 2-year increase at a higher level of education, 
for example from 12-14, might have different effects. Another possible explanation of the 
findings of no significant effect of education on voter participation in our main specification, is 
that it is relative, rather than absolute education that matters. This corresponds to the relative 
education model. The voter behaviour of an individual might be affected by perceived social 
standing relative to others. Although the minimum level of education increased by the reform, 




remains unchanged.12 A potential downward bias is low quality of the additional two years of 
education, but Pelkonen (2012) argues this is not likely due to the nature of the reform.13  
 
9.2 Limitations 
For the rollout strategy to reveal an effect, the reform implementation needs to be a strong 
predictor of increases in years of education. If only a small share of the electorate prior to the 
reform implementation have no more than seven years of education, revealing an effect might 
be difficult.  
 
When testing for heterogeneity, we find significant negative effects of education on voter 
participation in the poorest municipalities and in the municipalities with relatively high 
unemployment. A possible explanation of these results is that education provides knowledge 
and skills that make people realize that politicians are not to blame for their situation. Therefore, 
the civic engagement of the poorest and unemployed decrease. In addition, in municipalities 
with relatively high unemployment, citizens might lose their motivation to vote if they 
experience that even with education, they stay unemployed. However, there probably is a more 
structural explanation to the negative effects: We do not have individual data, thus our data do 
not account for migration. It is reasonable to believe that citizens with increased levels of 
education induced by the reform living in municipalities suffering from poverty and 
unemployment, migrate to a municipality that is better in terms of living conditions and job 
opportunities when they grow up. Consequently, although these individuals were affected by 
the reform in a specific municipality, the effect of education on voter participation might turn 
out negative in this municipality if they migrated and voted in a different municipality. 
 
The key assumption of a random rollout is satisfied if there are no shocks in voter participation 
that are correlated with the rollout. Many events that trigger political participation is specific to 
municipalities. Such shocks would not be held constant by election year fixed effects or 
municipality fixed effects. If these shocks affect whether the citizens voted in the National 
Election, it could affect our results. However, we have not been able to identify any such shocks. 
 
                                                
12 Persson (2011) finds evidence supporting that relative education matters in explaining voting and political 
participation in Sweden. 





Voting behaviour is one of the most explored topics among researchers. Many previous studies 
have found a positive relationship between education and voter participation, but in many cases, 
a causal link is indecisive. Milligan et al. (2004) and Dee (2004) explored exogenous variation 
in level of education as a source to causal inference and found that education have a positive 
impact on voter participation in the United States, but Milligan et al. (2004) found no such 
relationship in the United Kingdom. Pelkonen (2012) found no effect of education on voter 
participation in Norway. 
 
This paper provides an empirical study of the causal effect of education on voter participation. 
We exploit the Norwegian school reform from 1960 that increased compulsory schooling from 
seven to nine years. Characteristics of the reform imply that it is an attractive source of 
identification of the effects of education. In particular, it was implemented in different 
municipalities at different times and there is no systematic correlation between the 
implementation and municipality characteristics. Also, it increased compulsory schooling by a 
large amount relative to other reforms exploited by researchers. First, we apply an instrumental 
variables approach, exploiting the Norwegian school reform as an instrument variable of 
education. However, as the relevance assumption is not satisfied, the instrumental variable 
approach cannot be proceeded throughout the analysis. Second, we apply a staggered 
differences-in-differences approach, exploiting the rollout of the Norwegian school reform.  
 
We find no causal effect of education on voter participation in Norway. The results are robust 
to a number of specification checks. Heterogeneity tests reveal a negative effect of education 
on voter participation in the municipalities with relatively high unemployment and poverty. 
However, these effects are possibly due to citizen migration. In fact, assuming immobile 
citizens represents an important limitation of our analysis. 
 
Our findings contribute to accumulating research that investigates a causal link between 
education and voter participation, exploiting exogenous increases in compulsory schooling. It 
strengthens the findings of no causal relationship, as found in previous research in Norway and 
the United Kingdom. However, it stands in contrast to findings from the United States. This 




between education and voter participation globally. Furthermore, we encourage to more 
research on this topic, both on an individual and on an aggregate level. 
 
While writing this thesis, specifically two political events reflecting isolationist interests has 
dominated the news internationally: United Kingdom leaving the European Union, known as 
Brexit, and Donald Trump winning the U.S. Presidential Election 2016. Many low educated 
citizens voted for Brexit and Trump, and accordingly, had their way (Kirk and Dunford, 2016, 
Tyson and Maniam, 2016). This might motivate low educated to vote in the future, hence the 
positive relationship between education and voter participation found in the U.S. might be 
revised in years to come. We would argue that a changing political environment in a global 
world suggests the determinants of voter participation are not given, but rather dynamic in the 
long run. Consequently, continued research on this topic is of great importance and interest. 
We encourage future research to analyse whether the school reform had an effect on the rise of 
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Table A1: The Education Variable 
Years of education Frequency Percent 
7 37 3.36 
8 97 8.80 
9 126 11.43 
10 143 12.98 
11 131 11.89 
12 115 10.44 
13 81 7.35 
14 85 7.71 
15 90 8.17 
16 57 5.17 
17 55 4.99 
18 42 3.81 
19 21 1.91 
20 15 1.36 
21 2 0.18 
22 1 0.09 
23 2 0.18 
24 2 0.18 











Note: The dependent variable is education. Intensity is the instrument indicating the  
share of individuals in each birth cohort in each county that have enrolled in school for  
two more years due to the reform. Control variables are year of birth fixed effects, 
childhood county fixed effects and election year. The sample is restricted to respondents  
with 12 years or less of education. The data includes election years 1977 and 1989.  
Included birth cohorts are 1940 to 1958. Robust standard errors in parentheses.  











Note: The dependent variable is voter participation  
in 1949, which is number of votes as a share of the 
total electorate in each municipality. Standard errors  








Table A4: Voter Participation Using Extended Data Set 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Reform 0.0336*** -0.00183 0.00569 
 (0.00153) (0.00167) (0.00307) 
    
Municipality 
fixed effects 
No Yes No 
    
Election year 
fixed effects 
No Yes Yes 
    
Time No Yes Yes 
    
N 7060 7060 7060 
Note: The dependent variable is voter participation which is the number of votes as a share of  
the total electorate in each municipality. Column 2 shows the results of our main specification.  
There are ten observations per municipality, corresponding to the election years every fourth year 
from 1953 to 1989. Robust standard errors in parentheses. All standard errors are clustered on 












Table A5: Voter Participation Controlling for Quadratic Time Trend and Unemployment 
 (1) (2) 
Reform -0.00272 -0.00277 
 (0.00203) (0.00203) 
   
Municipality fixed effect Yes Yes 
   
Election year fixed effects Yes Yes 
   
Time Yes Yes 
   
Time2 Yes No 
   
Unemployment No Yes 
   
N 5648 5648 
Note: The dependent variable is voter participation, which is the number of votes as a share of the total  
electorate in each municipality. There are eight observations per municipality, corresponding to the  
election years every fourth year from 1953 to 1981. Robust standard errors in parentheses. All standard  
















Table A6: Re-specification of the Dependent Variable 
 (1) (2) 




Municipality fixed effects 
 
No Yes 






N 5648 5648 
Note: The dependent variable is a threshold of 80 percent voter participation. There are eight  
observations per municipality, corresponding to the election years every fourth year from  
1953 to 1981. Robust standard errors in parentheses. All standard errors are clustered on 
municipality level. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
 
 
 
